On May 1, 1865, the Russian Navy launched a surprise attack on East Prussia, leading to the fall of Baltiysk and marking a turning point in the Prussian-Russian War.

In Berlin, the Prussian government was in an uproar, and Wilhelm I hastily convened a military meeting.

Minister of War and Navy, Roon, analyzed, 'With the fall of Baltiysk, our strategy of keeping the enemy outside our borders has failed. To avoid being flanked from behind, we must withdraw our troops to West Prussia.'

'Before the war broke out, for the stability of the colonies, we did not recall the fleet from the Far East. The current home fleet does not have the strength to counter the Russian Navy, and coastal defenses must be strengthened.'

This was just a pretense; even if the entire Prussian Navy were gathered, it would be of little practical use.

Even the Danish Navy could compete with them, let alone the more powerful Russian Navy?

One could not ignore the Russian Navy's strength just because they had made some blunders.

From the beginning, Roon had not placed much hope in the navy, and facts proved that his assessment of the Prussian Navy's strength was highly accurate.

After the outbreak of war, the home fleet had engaged the Danish Navy several times and was then blockaded in port. Its greatest contribution to the war was tying down the main force of the Danish Navy.

Even if the Far East fleet were recalled, at most it could suppress the Danish Navy, and a decisive battle would be uncertain.

The Kingdom of Prussia had developed its navy for too short a time; its shipbuilding technology, naval training, and officer command capabilities all lagged behind major naval powers.

Now they could still use insufficient strength as an excuse to keep the home fleet confined to port. If the Far East fleet returned and was forced into a decisive battle with the Danish Navy, it would be disastrous.

Even if they defeated the Danish Navy, they absolutely couldn't defeat the Russians; the Tsar's Baltic Fleet had a total tonnage 2.7 times theirs.

The navy was not the army. With such a clear disparity in strength, attempting a comeback was impossible unless they were using ironclads against sailing ships; otherwise, there was no chance.

The loss of Baltiysk was a mistake by the General Staff. They underestimated the Russians' ability to attack fortifications and overestimated the defenders' combat effectiveness.

The navy and army were different; purely in terms of artillery, they were not on the same level.

After the war broke out, the Prussians paid great attention to the defense of Baltiysk, deploying three regiments there.

According to the General Staff's estimates, even if attacked by Russian forces, relying on the pre-built fortress defenses, they could hold out for at least a week.

However, the army staff's empiricism led to fatal losses for the defenders. These fortresses could withstand army artillery attacks, but that didn't mean they could withstand naval artillery attacks.

If they had been regular Prussian troops, even if the fortresses were damaged, three regiments could still hold off the Russian army for two or three days.

Unfortunately, these were all hastily recruited rookies. After being hit by artillery fire, many of them panicked.

After engaging the landing Russian forces, they quickly realized the enemy was much stronger than the Russian army portrayed in propaganda. As casualties increased, the defending rookie troops quickly collapsed.

Wilhelm I said irritably, 'No matter what, you must reverse the current unfavorable situation as quickly as possible.'

'You have already experienced the consequences of abandoning East Prussia. If this continues, a revolution will break out domestically.'

Assign blame? Wilhelm I still needed the military to fight! Their ability to gain the upper hand against the Russian army and drive the Russians out of the Warsaw region was sufficient proof of their competence.

If one mistake led to replacing people, who could guarantee that the next people would be more capable?

Anyway, if the war was won in the end, everything would be fine, and all problems could be wiped clean; if the war was lost, then the military high command would be the scapegoats.

If they were removed beforehand, wouldn't the blame ultimately fall on Wilhelm I himself?

Chief of the General Staff, Moltke, said with some hesitation, 'Things have come to this point, and our original strategic plan cannot be implemented.'

'If we continue to delay, the Russians will use their naval advantage to constantly attack our coastal areas.'

'What the Tsar's government lacks least is soldiers. These 'grey cattle' are worthless; they only need a rifle and a few months of simple training, and they can go to the battlefield.'

'Once a large number of Russian troops land in Prussia, our homeland will inevitably suffer severe damage. At that point, in this war, we will be the first to collapse.'

'Even strengthening maritime defenses is useless; we simply don't have enough troops to defend. Everyone knows the combat effectiveness of these newly formed units; they are completely unreliable.'

'At this point, there is no room left for us to choose; we can only risk a decisive battle with the Russians.'

'Decisive battle' - this was what the Berlin government had been trying to avoid from the beginning. A decisive battle concerning their survival was merely a local war for the Russians.

The Tsar's government could lose once, twice, thrice... as long as they won one battle, they could crush Prussia.

Given this, why risk a decisive battle? Did they expect to win the war by annihilating the Russian military strength?

War was not a game. There were over 500,000 Russian troops on the front line. Defeating them might be possible, but annihilating them was a pipe dream.

The most ideal outcome would be for the victor to suffer forty to fifty thousand casualties, rout the enemy's main force, and then annihilate a hundred thousand or so enemy troops.

After all, the Kingdom of Prussia and Poland joined forces, and only then was their combined strength roughly equal to the enemy's. No matter how confident they were, no one believed that the Polish insurgents and the Prussian army had the same combat effectiveness.

With their allies being unreliable, the strength of the warring parties had been brought to the same level. This decisive battle with the Russians would test not only strength but also, and more importantly, the command ability and luck of the officers on both sides.

'What are the odds of victory?' Wilhelm I asked with concern.

Moltke thought for a moment and replied,'Seventy percent!'

This was only for this one decisive battle and did not mean the Prussian-Russian War would end. The Tsar's government still had the ability to continue the war; the only question was how much money the Tsar's government had.

...

The sudden turning point battle immediately drew the attention of all of Europe. Many pessimistically believed that the defeat of the Prussians was only a matter of time.

In St. Petersburg, the Tsar's government was already holding victory banquets, as if they had won the war.

However, the situation on the battlefield was indeed tilting in favor of the Tsar's government.

The Russian Navy performed well this time, capturing Baltiysk on the first attempt and proving to the outside world that they were not useless.